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ABSTRACT 
Examining the Effects of Trait Rumination on Hostile Attribution Bias 
by 
Kyle A. Suhr 
Previous research supports the idea that individuals high in trait anger tend to experience more 
hostile attribution bias. According to the Integrative Cognitive Model, cognitive factors, such as 
rumination, may increase the risk of hostile attribution bias and any subsequent aggressive 
behaviors. Sex differences are apparent in rumination and anger expression. The present research 
explored the potential role trait rumination plays in hostile attribution bias as well as potential 
conditional effects of sex on this relationship. Participants were asked to complete a number of 
self-report measures and vignettes of ambiguously hostile situations adapted to improve 
reliability. Hypotheses were largely supported and trait anger rumination was significantly 
predictive of hostile attribution bias; however, conditional effects of sex were non-significant. 
The adapted hostile attribution bias measure had improved reliability and may have utility for a 
survey-based method to assessing hostile attribution bias. Findings may further our 
understanding of hostile interpretations and potential for subsequent aggressive behaviors in high 
trait ruminators in ambiguous situations as well as lead to potential areas of intervention to 
reduce anger and anger rumination.     
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Cognitive processes, such as rumination, are known to exacerbate and prolong emotional 
experiences and influence subsequent behavioral expression. With anger, rumination can worsen 
and lengthen the emotional experience as well as increase the risk of aggression. Anger 
expression is also influenced by contextual cues, physiological reactivity, genetic 
predispositions, and perceptual biases including hostile attribution bias; however, little is known 
how some cognitive processes within anger influence one another. The current study examined 
trait rumination and hostile attribution bias in the expression of anger.   
Rumination 
Rumination is defined as “a mode of responding to distress that involves repetitively and 
passively focusing on symptoms of distress and on the possible causes and consequences of these 
symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008, p. 400). Nolen-Hoeksema and 
colleagues originally identified a ruminative style of thinking from the depression literature 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993; Nolen-Hoeksema, 
Parker, & Larson, 1994; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008).  
Rumination was shown to exacerbate a person's mood after provoking situations, where a 
person would continually focus and evaluate negative perceptions, in turn exacerbating their 
depressed mood and decreasing the likelihood of engaging in enjoyable activities or behaviors 
that may distract them (Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990). Morrow and Nolen-Hoeksema 
(1990) found that participants assigned to a passive rumination task reported more sadness than 
participants assigned to an active rumination, passive distraction, or active distraction tasks. 
During natural disasters, individuals experiencing depression who engaged in rumination prior to 
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the disaster reported more depression in the following weeks after the disaster (Nolen-Hoeksema 
& Morrow, 1991). These studies suggest that individuals who focus on their symptoms and 
possible causes of their emotions tend to remain symptomatic longer than those who distract 
themselves to cope. This has since been extended to other negative mood states, including anger 
(e.g., Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998), but it is worth examining the original 
conceptualization in greater depth.   
Rumination Theories  
The ruminative style of thinking led to the development of the response style theory of 
depression, which describes how rumination amplifies and prolongs a depressive episode by 
interfering with maintaining simple instrumental behaviors (e.g., hygiene upkeep or general 
health care; Kuhl, 1981). Rumination is believed to increase the chance that an individual in a 
depressive episode will consider more depressive explanations for his or her current mood state 
and increase the accessibility of negative memories (Diener & Dweck, 1978; Kuhl, 1981). The 
ruminative response style theory proposes three mechanisms thought to exacerbate depressed 
mood: interference with attention, concentration, and instrumental behaviors (e.g., basic social 
skills), enhancement of existing maladapative cognitive styles, and increased chances of 
considering depressive explanations for depressed mood (e.g., Diener & Dweck, 1978; Kuhl, 
1981; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990).  
 A competing theory, called reduced concreteness theory, proposes that rumination 
reduces concrete and/or abstract, negative thinking styles (e.g., Watkins & Moulds, 2005). 
Lowered concrete thinking was believed to reduce vivid imagery experiences, inhibit activation 
of underlying emotion structures, and impede emotional processing (e.g., Foa & Kozak, 1986; 
Watkins & Moulds, 2005). Watkins and Mould (2005) demonstrated that depressed participants 
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expressed more abstract-type thinking prior to rumination induction, and when induced with 
more concrete thinking they reported better problem-solving.   
Rumination Types 
Research suggests that some types of rumination may be more functional than others. 
Concrete rumination is a non-evaluative rumination type characterized by a self-focus on an 
individual's feelings more directly and intimately, where individuals tend to focus on 'how' an 
event occurred and think about specific, concrete actions or events leading to those outcomes 
(Rimes & Watkins, 2005; Showers, 1988; Teasdale, 1999). Watkins and Moulds (2005) 
described concrete rumination as more adaptive or advantageous, as the focus is on more 
unstable causes of negative events, which may influence the perception of control and problem-
solving. This type of rumination tends to facilitate emotional processing and is associated with 
specific, contextual details about emotionally-provoking situations (e.g., Watkins, 2008).  
 Another type of rumination is known as abstract rumination, which is believed to be more 
maladaptive compared to concrete rumination (Teasdale, 1999). Abstract ruminators tend to 
focus on goal-related discrepancies and 'why' events occurred, including underlying traits and 
stables causes of the events (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; Rimes & Watkins, 2005; 
Showers, 1988). Abstract rumination may be considered disadvantageous because the individual 
focuses on factors of events that cannot be controlled or changed, and thus bolsters depression 
and perceived loss of control. Abstract rumination facilitates emotional processing differently 
than concrete rumination, where the focus is not on concrete, situational details but rather on 
general, indistinct details that are more likely to be cross-situational.  
Similar distinctions between subtypes of rumination were found in a measure developed 
by Treynor, Gonzalez, and Nolen-Hoeksema (2003). The brooding subscale was associated with 
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passive comparisons of an individual's current situation with an unachieved standard, while 
reflective pondering was related to an individual turning inward, increasing the chances of 
problem solving. Although the current review uncovered no measures that focused directly on 
abstract or concrete rumination, similarities are apparent between brooding and abstract 
rumination as well as reflective pondering and concrete rumination. It may be the case that 
Treynor's et al. (2003) methodology could be used as a measure of abstract and concrete 
rumination.       
Effects of Rumination on Anger 
As noted above, rumination was found to impact other emotional states, such as anger. 
Siewert and colleagues suggested rumination was a typical response to anger and the focus of 
rumination tended to be explanation- or solution-focused (Siewert, Kubiak, Jonas, & Weber, 
2011). In addition, trait anger moderated the effect revenge-focused rumination had on social 
well-being (Siewert et al., 2011). Angry individuals were proposed to hold metacognitive beliefs 
unique to anger (Simpson & Papagerogiou, 2003). Metacognitive beliefs are similar to 
rumination and related thoughts/feelings after emotional activation and may be related to thought 
processes and a person's ability to regulate them (Simpson & Papageurogiou, 2003). For 
example, negative metacognitive beliefs may involve rumination and detrimental effects on 
functioning in interpersonal situations. In a recent study, rumination was found to predict anger 
and aggressive behaviors after provocation in individuals who held positive beliefs about 
rumination (i.e., believed rumination may assist in problem solving) compared to those with 
negative rumination beliefs (Krans, Moulds, Grisham, Lang, & Denson, 2014).  
In a more recent study, it was shown that rumination was related to exacerbated anger 
post-provocation (Peled & Moretti, 2010). In experimental conditions, rumination played a key 
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role in the experience and expression of anger (Ray, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2008; Rusting & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1998). In addition, following anger-provoking stimuli, participants instructed to 
ruminate tended to report more anger and aggression and were at a higher risk of retaliation 
(Bushman, Bonacci, Pederson, Vasquez, & Miller, 2005; Maxwell, 2004). Sukhodolsky, Golub, 
and Cromwell (2001) identified a different type of rumination, independent of depression, called 
anger rumination.  
Anger rumination is believed to involve three different processes that influence the 
experience of anger: memories of past anger experiences, attention to immediate anger 
experiences, and counterfactual thought about anger experiences (Sukhodolsky et al., 2001). 
More specifically, memories of past anger episodes may trigger current anger states, in turn 
leading to increased attention to anger that may amplify its intensity/duration, and counterfactual 
thoughts may lead to negative consequences (e.g., retaliation). According to Sukhodolsky et al. 
(2001), after initial provocation, individuals who experience anger would either continue to focus 
on their current angry mood or sporadically return their attention back to the event at a later time.  
Through a path analysis, Peled and Moretti (2010) found rumination related to anger is 
distinct from rumination related to sadness, though both were independently predictive of 
aggression. Anger rumination may be related to trait physical and verbal aggression and hostility 
(Anestis, Anestis, Shelby, & Joiner, 2009). One possible reason why anger rumination increases 
the risk of aggression may be related to resource depletion related to self-control (i.e., effortful 
control; Denson, 2009).  
An individual's capacity for self-control is believed to be a limited, yet renewable, 
resource that may be depleted (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007). Denson (2009) proposed that 
individuals may be motivated not to ruminate after anger provocation, as rumination is intrusive 
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and aversive in nature. However, ceasing rumination processes requires a significant amount of 
the limited amount of effortful self-control, as the individual must down-regulate the intensity of 
their anger experience, suppress anger thoughts, and refrain from aggressive urges. Some studies 
further support that anger rumination reduces self-control (i.e., increases demands on executive 
control mechanisms) after provocation and increases the risk and severity of aggression (Denson, 
2009; Denson, DeWall, & Finel, 2012a; Denson, Pederson, Friese, Hahm, & Roberts, 2011). 
Effortful control was found to partially mediate the relationship between anger rumination and 
reactive aggression (White & Turner, 2014).  
Influence of Reappraisal and Distraction  
Related to effortful control, distraction and reappraisal processes are believed to be some 
of the most effective ways to reduce rumination's impact on negative emotions (e.g., anger or 
depression; Denson, Moulds, & Grisham, 2012b; Fennell & Teasdale, 1984). Fennell and 
Teasdale (1984) found depressed individuals in a distracted condition (i.e., instructed to focus on 
non-emotional stimuli, such as slides of an outdoor scene) alleviated their depressed mood more 
effectively than a control condition (i.e., instructed to look at a square white light projected on a 
wall). Blagden and Crask (1996) found similar results for individuals with anxiety, where 
individuals assigned to distraction groups reported lower anxious mood compared to rumination 
conditions. An alternative to reduce rumination may be reappraisal, which may facilitate 
adaptive processing of anger memories in turn reducing the experience of anger (Denson et al., 
2012b). Reappraisal is a process in which an individual mentally modifies how an individual 
evaluates a situation, prior to the full emotional response (Gross, 2002).    
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Sex Differences 
Multiple studies have shown sex differences in rumination as well as anger (e.g., Frodi, 
1978; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1994). Women were frequently found to be more likely to use 
depressive rumination as a coping strategy than men (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1994; 
Watkins, 2004). In a recent meta-analysis, Johnson and Whisman (2013) found that women 
tended to score higher on self-report measures of trait general rumination as well as brooding and 
reflection (i.e., reflective pondering). Further supporting a sex difference and preference toward 
rumination, Nolen-Hoeksema (1987) observed that male college students tended to focus on 
distraction-type tasks that focused attention away from depression (e.g., engaging in physical 
activities). Women tended to focus on maintaining attention on depressive symptoms, which is 
indicative of a tendency to react in less active ways and more towards rumination.  
However, sex differences in anger rumination may be in the opposing direction, where 
men may be more likely to ruminate than women. For example, one study found that men were 
angrier and expressed more negative and aggressive content when asked to record their thoughts 
after provocation and showed elevated physiological responses (e.g., increased heart rate; Frodi, 
1978). In another study, Bushman (2002) found similar sex differences, in that men were angrier 
and more aggressive in a rumination condition compared to women in the rumination condition 
and both sexes in the distraction condition. Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema (1998) found similar 
results, such that men and women reacted differently when provoked. For example, when given a 
choice to engage in rumination or distraction after provocation, men were equally likely to 
choose either task but women were more likely to choose rumination in a neutral mood or 
distraction in an angry mood.  
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Another study by Verona (2005) found women may be likely to aggress as measured by a 
display of shocks delivered to a ‘confederate’ during rumination. Verona (2005) selected various 
levels of trait rumination in men and women and assigned them to conditions, one of which was 
aggressive in nature (i.e., participants were given a chance to administer fake shocks). Results 
showed that all participants who ruminated administered more shocks with ruminating women 
administering the most shocks compared to men. Further, research supports that men and women 
react differently to anger provocation. Knobloch-Westerwick and colleagues found that men had 
a preference for anger experiences and chose to increase their exposure to emotionally-
provocative news articles, while women had a preference for distraction and more positive news 
articles (Knobloch-Westerwick & Alter, 2006; O'Neal & Taylor, 1989).  
State/Trait Anger 
Anger is an emotional state that many individuals experience as a normal part of life. 
Anger is typically defined as a negative, self-perceived phenomenological state (Spielberger, 
Jacobs, Russel, & Crane, 1983; Spielberger et al., 1985). It is often thought that anger is 
triggered by provoking contextual cues, which result in a variety of cognitive, behavioral, or 
physiological responses (e.g., Kassinove & Sukhodolsky, 1995; Salzinger, 1995). Cattell and 
Scheier (1961) developed a theory that describes how emotions, such as anger, may be 
experienced in two different ways: as a transient mood state (also known as 'state') or as a 
dispositional personality dimension (a 'trait'). State anger is characterized by transient, subjective 
feelings of anger that may vary from mild irritation to rage (Spielberger, 1999). In contrast, trait 
anger is defined as a disposition to perceive a variety of situations as frustrating or annoying 
(Spielberger, 1999). Some research suggests that individuals high in trait anger tend to respond 
   
 
16 
more quickly with anger and are at higher risk of acting aggressively than individuals who are 
provoked, compared to those low in trait anger (e.g., van Goozen, Frijda, & van de Poll, 1994).   
Aggression Types 
Theoretically, two different types of aggression exist (e.g., Berkowitz, 1993): hostile 
aggression (i.e., impulsive, reactive, and motivated by a desire to cause harm) and instrumental 
aggression (i.e., intentional and proactive with some goal other than harming the victim). The 
Generalized Aggression Model suggests that aggressive behaviors may contain elements of both 
types, making these categories somewhat artificial (Anderson & Bushman, 2002).  
Other researchers make a distinction between aggression based on the presence of anger 
called reactive and proactive aggression (e.g., Dodge & Coie, 1987). Reactive aggression is 
characterized by aggressive behaviors expressed out of anger, while proactive aggression is 
aggressive behaviors not expressed in anger but to help pursue another goal (Dodge & Coie, 
1987). Both reactive and proactive aggression appear to share some characteristics with the 
aggressive types described in GAM. Reactive aggression is believed to be more trait-like in 
nature than proactive, as individuals higher in this trait are typically more likely to react in 
aggressive ways out of anger than others (e.g., Blair, 2001, 2004). Trait aggression overlaps in 
some ways with trait anger (e.g., measures of trait anger and aggression often reference reactive 
aggression; Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008); however, they have some subtle differences (e.g., 
Bettencourt, Talley, Benjamin, & Valentine, 2006; Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008). Trait anger 
and trait aggression are often correlated; yet, trait anger may only be a predictor of aggressive 
behavior in response to provocation (e.g., Bettencourt et al., 2006). Hence, various theorized 
cognitive processes have been invoked to explain possible links between trait anger and 
aggressive behavior.   
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Other Cognitive Processes and Anger 
Hostile Attribution Bias 
Wilkowski and Robinson (2008, 2010) posited that hostile attribution bias is an automatic 
bias toward hostile interpretations or situations and believed to lead to hostile interpretations in 
two possible ways: 1) high trait anger or trait reactive aggressive individuals have a heightened 
vigilance for hostile stimuli, in turn potentially leading to biased interpretations in a hostile 
direction (e.g., Blair, 2003; Dodge, 1991) or, 2) individuals with high amounts of these traits 
have preexisting hostile interpretations (i.e., trait rumination) that are reinforced (e.g., Bushman, 
2002). A plethora of research supports the first proposal, where hostile interpretations occur 
early in information processing and occur separately from selective attention processes (e.g., 
Wilkowski, Robinson, Gordon, & Troop-Gordon, 2007). However, as described above, not as 
much research was completed on the second proposal. 
Anderson and Bushman (2002) suggested that dispositional inferences occur early and 
automatically in processing information. This is further supported by Wilkowski and Robinson 
(2008), who described that high trait anger individuals may extract "hostile gist interpretations" 
(p. 10) early in processing of situations and should exhibit difficulties reconciling incompatible 
cues (i.e., nonhostile cues); therefore, they should preferentially attend to nonhostile cues in 
ambiguous hostile scenes because it takes them greater time and effort to interpret.   
Wilkowski et al. (2007) tracked eye movements in ambiguous hostile scenes and found 
that individuals high in trait anger tended to experience greater hostile gist interpretations prior to 
encoding specific hostile or non-hostile stimuli. After this initial interpretation, individuals 
higher in trait anger also tended to preferentially attend to nonhostile cues suggesting that hostile 
stimuli per se are not instrumental to hostile attribution bias and that hostile biases are not 
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necessarily operative during interpretation processes. Rather, Wilkowski et al. (2007) described 
that high trait anger individuals appear to have greater difficulties reconciling nonhostile cues 
into their initial hostile interpretation and that attentional biases toward hostile stimuli operates at 
a later time after interpretational processing is complete.  
Other studies found that more aggressive individuals are more likely to interpret 
ambiguous situations as hostile, even without explicit instruction to do so (e.g., Zelli, Cervone, & 
Huesmann, 1996). The Integrated Cognitive Model (summarized below) describes how 
automatic interpretation processes, such as hostile attribution bias, may be corrected or 
exacerbated if further attentional resources are recruited via effortful processing versus 
rumination. 
Aggression Theories 
While historically a number of theories have described human aggression, two models 
seem to exhibit current broad-based support, namely the General Aggression Model and the 
Integrated Cognitive Model. The General Aggression Model (GAM) describes how a variety of 
factors may increase the risk of anger expression and aggressive behaviors (Anderson & 
Bushman, 2002). The GAM explains how aggression may be expressed through three factors: 
inputs, routes, and outcomes (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Generalized Aggression Model.  
Note. Figure borrowed from Anderson & Busman (2002).  
Inputs are causal factors that may influence the final outcome behavior and can be 
person-based (e.g., trait anger or sex-related) or situationally-driven (e.g., aggressive cues or 
provocation). Routes are internal processes that influence potential outcomes and are described 
as internal states, such as cognition, arousal, or affect. Cognition may influence aggression by 
increasing the accessibility of aggressive concepts in the individual's memory (i.e., priming) 
through hostile thoughts and scripts for responding. Finally, outcomes are the observable 
behavior that may include complex information processes (e.g., immediate appraisal, reappraisal, 
and decision processing). Aggression in the GAM is the critical outcome variable and defined as 
any behavior directed toward other individuals carried out with the intent to cause harm 
(Anderson & Bushman, 2002).  
The GAM was developed to integrate various existing theories on the expression of 
aggression (Anderson & Bushman, 2002. As a social-cognitive model, an aggressive-related 
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knowledge structure (i.e., hostile thoughts and scripts) is believed to increase the accessibility of 
aggressive/angry memories, in turn increasing the risk of aggressive behavior expression. One of 
the main routes in which this aggressive knowledge structure is thought to increase 
aggressiveness is through the expression of affective states, such as anger (Anderson, Gentile, & 
Buckley, 2007). Aggressive scripts may be used as guides for behavior and social problem 
solving by accessing aggressive information learned over time (Huesmann, 1998).  
Many studies utilize the GAM to explain aggressive responses to media and/or video 
games (e.g., Bösche, 2010; Hollingdale & Greitemeyer, 2013); however, many of these studies 
focused on cognitive styles rather than processes, such as rumination. Ferguson and Dyck (2012) 
suggested that the GAM may not be as sufficient in explaining aggression as it was when it was 
first developed, as much of the research supporting the cognitive components of the GAM are 
from studies on exposure to violence and subsequent priming effects of aggressive-related 
thoughts. Only one study was found that described how the GAM may explain rumination's 
influence on aggression, where rumination increased the accessibility of aggressive-related 
thoughts via increased reported angry affect (Pederson et al., 2011).  
Another model called the Integrated Cognitive Model (ICM) of trait anger and reaction 
aggression was proposed by Wilkowski and Robinson (2008) to explain how other cognitive 
processes (e.g., hostile interpretations, rumination, or effortful control) influence trait anger and 
aggression (Figure 2). According to the ICM, individuals high in trait anger are more likely to 
automatically attend to hostile stimuli or perceive non-ambiguous stimuli as hostile through a 
process known as hostile attribution bias (Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008, 2010). These 
individuals are believed to be automatically biased toward hostile interpretations of situations, in 
turn leading to increased anger expression. Following interpretation biases toward hostility, the 
   
 
21 
ICM suggests that these individuals then may ruminate about the interpretation-related biases or 
reappraise the situation and recruit effortful control to suppress anger expression or aggression. 
Rumination is thought to exacerbate anger and prolong the risk of reactive aggression. If an 
individual lacks the capacity for effortful control processes, they are less likely to counteract 
anger and reactive aggression tendencies. In other words, low trait anger individuals are thought 
to be able to recruit cognitive control in hostile situations, thus less likely to prolong anger or 
exhibit aggressive behaviors, of which there are several possible types.  
 
Figure 2. Integrated Cognitive Model of Trait Anger and Reactive Aggression.  
Note. Figure borrowed from Wilkowski & Robinson (2008) 
Effortful control may be useful in explaining situations perceived to be hostile via three 
specific pathways. The first is that recruiting effortful control resources may enable reappraisal 
of situational information to more non-hostile interpretations. A second pathway is that effortful 
control may interrupt rumination, allowing one to distract oneself from hostile thoughts. The 
third pathway posited is that effortful control resources may be used to suppress aggressive 
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tendencies and expressive behavior related to anger arousal (e.g., facial expressions; Dewall, 
Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007).  
Many theories on aggression, including the GAM, may describe the importance of early, 
automatic and subsequent controlled processes that increase the risk of aggression; however, 
each theory differs on the specific processes they emphasize (Wilkowski & Robsinson, 2010). 
Cognition may not be monolithic in nature, as described in the GAM or other aggression 
theories; therefore an integrated cognitive model was developed to describe the component sub-
processes of cognition in aggression (Wilkowski & Robinson, 2010). For this reason, the ICM 
may provide greater utility over the GAM in describing cognitive processes in the current 
project. The ICM appears to expand upon the GAM by providing more detailed pathways in 
which cognitive factors may influence one another in anger expression after provocation.  
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CHAPTER 2 
RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
Overall, the ICM proposed that hostile biases reinforce pre-existing hostile interpretations 
(Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008), which is consistent with literature on rumination (e.g., Rusting 
& Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). However, most research in this area focuses on self-report or is 
described at the dispositional level (e.g., Collins & Bell, 1997; Martin & Dahlen, 2005). It is 
possible that self-report may not directly assess the complex cognitive process of rumination 
compared to other methodologies, such as measuring time to disengage from negative stimuli 
(for further review of this methodology see Siegel, Steinhauer, Carter, Ramel, & Thase, 2003). 
However, it may be that an effective self-report measure relating ambiguous stimuli to possible 
types of biased interpretations has not yet been fully developed.  
Individuals high in trait anger tend to exhibit hostile attribution bias in provoking or 
ambiguously-provoking situations. In addition, trait anger and trait rumination tend to be 
significantly related; however, research is limited on how trait anger rumination directly 
influences hostile attribution bias. Sex differences are also apparent in the experience and 
expression of rumination and anger. The current research examined the relationships between 
trait rumination and hostile attribution bias as well as potential conditional effects of sex on the 
relationship between trait rumination and hostile attribution bias.   
Hypotheses 
1. Consistent with past research, it was expected that trait anger (measured by the Trait 
Anger Scale) would be significantly and positively related to trait rumination scores 
(measured by the Ruminative Response Scale and Anger Rumination Scale). 
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2. Trait anger rumination and general rumination would be positively associated with 
hostile and negative subscales of the Adapted Hostile Attribution Bias Vignettes. 
3. The brooding subscale of the Ruminative Response Scale would exhibit stronger 
relationships with hostile attribution bias (measured by the hostile subscale of the 
Adapted Hostile Attribution Bias Vignettes) compared to the reflective pondering 
subscale.  
4. The strength of the effect of trait anger rumination on hostile attribution bias 
(measured by the hostile subscale of the Adapted Hostile Attribution Bias Vignettes) 
would be conditional to sex of the participant, in which the strength would be greater 
for males as compared to females.  
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CHAPTER 3 
METHOD 
Participants 
Five hundred and four students enrolled in psychology courses at a Southeastern 
university completed a battery of online questionnaires through an online participant pool called 
SONA (Sona Systems, Inc., 2012), in exchange for 0.5 extra credit coursework. One hundred 
and thirty-three participants (26.39%) were excluded from analyses because they finished the 
survey in less than 12.8 minutes (based on a minimum of 5 seconds per item) or declined to 
answer at least 75% of all items. The time-limit was a conservative estimate of time to maximize 
the potential participants would attend to every item and answer in an honest, reliable manner. 
Thus, 371 participants were included for all primary analyses. Two-hundred and fifty-seven 
(69.30%) of the included participants were female. Two-hundred and ninety-two participants 
reported as being Caucasian (78.70%), thirty-six as African American (9.70%), twelve as Asian 
(3.20%), eight as Hispanic (2.20%), two as Pacific Islander (0.5%), and eighteen as bi- or multi-
racial (4.90%), with three participants not reporting on this variable. The average age of the 
included participants was 20.40 (SD = 4.52; range = 18 to 52 years old). Demographic 
information for the excluded participants were as follows: sixty-six (49.60%) identified as 
female, eighty-six (64.70%) identified as Caucasian, nineteen as African American (14.30%), six 
as Asian (4.50%), two as Hispanic (1.50%), four as Pacific Islander (3.0%), and six as bi- or 
multi-racial (4.50%), with ten participants not reporting their race, and the average age of 
excluded participants was 19.66 (SD = 3.76; range = 18 to 48).   
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Procedure 
Participants were given informed consent and asked to fill out a number of self-report 
questionnaires and vignettes (described below). The surveys and vignettes were presented to 
participants in a random order to control for potential order effects. This study was approved by 
the Institutional Review Board at East Tennessee State University prior to data collection.   
Materials 
State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory - Second Edition  
The State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory - Second Edition (STAXI-2; Appendix I; 
Spielberger, 1999) is a 44-item measure of an individual's anger and expression of hostility 
toward others. The STAXI-2 is divided into five subscales: State Anger, Trait Anger, Anger-in, 
Anger-out, and Anger Control. The present study used the State Anger and Trait Anger 
subscales. The STAXI-2 had sufficient support for validity from relationships with other 
measures of anger and hostility (Spielberger, 1999).   
State Anger Subscale (SAS). The SAS consists of 10 items that measure a participant's 
current level of angry feelings (e.g., 'I am furious' or 'I am mad') on a 4-point rating scale (current 
feelings: 1 = not at all; 2 = somewhat; 3 = moderately; 4 = very much so). The State Anger Scale 
had good internal consistency (α = .93; Spielberger, 1988) and construct validity (i.e., State 
Anger Scale scores were found to be reliably predictive of responses to acute behavioral 
challenges; Kamarack, Manuck, & Jennings, 1990). Items were added into a total, summary 
score. In the current study, Cronbach's α was .91 for the SAS. The State Anger score was used to 
statistically control for the current anger-related mood of participants when analyzing 
hypotheses.  
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Trait Anger Subscale (TAS). The TAS is a 10-item measure of global or chronic 
tendencies to experience anger. Participants were asked to rate how well an item describes how 
he or she feels or reacts (e.g., ‘I generally feel I have a fiery temper’) on a 4-point scale ranging 
from 1 = almost never to 4 = almost always. The TAS was shown to have strong reliability, α 
coefficients ranged from .81 to .91, and adequate test-retest reliability, ranging from r = .70 to 
.77 (Jacobs, Latham, & Brown, 1988; Spielberger, 1999). Items were added into a total, 
summary score that resulted in a Cronbach’s α of .85 for the TAS.    
Anger Rumination Scale  
The Anger Rumination Scale (ARS; Appendix II; Sukhodolsky et al., 2001) is a 19-item 
measure of rumination processes in response to anger-provoking experiences. Items involve 
continued focus on angry elements, such as 'after an argument is over, I keep fighting with this 
person in my imagination', and are rated on a 4-point rating scale (ranged from 1 = almost never 
to 4 = almost always). Sukhodolsky et al. (2001) found that the ARS had adequate convergent 
validity, was moderately correlated with subscales of the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory 
(Trait Anger r = .57; Anger-In r = .52; Anger-Out r = .43; Anger-Control r = .35), and had 
adequate test-retest reliability (r = .77). Suhr and Nesbit (2013) demonstrated that the ARS had 
relatively high reliability (Chronbach's α ranged from .72 to .90). Cronbach’s α for the current 
study was .94.  
Ruminative Response Scale 
The Ruminative response scale (RRS; Appendix III; Treynor et al., 2003) is a 22-item 
measure of general rumination and divided into two subscales: reflection and brooding, rated on 
a 4-point rating scale (1 = almost never; 4 = almost always). The Reflection subscale (similar to 
concrete rumination) was developed to assess the degree to which individuals intentionally focus 
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attention inward to alleviate depressive symptoms through problem solving (e.g., 'go away by 
yourself and think about why you feel this way'). The Brooding subscale (similar to abstract 
rumination) was developed to assess an individual's passive comparison of their current situation 
with an unachieved standard (e.g., 'what am I doing to deserve this'). Treynor et al. (2003) 
reported adequate alpha coefficients for these subscales ranged from .72 to .77 and the rest-retest 
correlation ranged from r = .60 to .62. Cronbach’s α estimates for the current study were .95 
(total score), .85 (brooding subscale), and .83 (reflective pondering subscale). The RRS was 
moderately related to measures of depression, trait anxiety, and neuroticism indicating good 
construct validity (Roelofs, Muris, Huibers, Peeters, & Arntz, 2006).     
Social Desirability Scale 
The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSDS; Appendix IV; Crowne & 
Marlowe, 1960) is a 33-item, true/false measure of social desirability and divided into two 
subscales (Attribution and Denial). Items included assessed if an individual has a tendency to 
respond in a socially-desirable manner, such as ‘I have never intensely disliked anyone’ or ‘no 
matter who I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener’. Crowne and Marlowe (1960) reported 
that the MCSDS had adequate psychometrics including high internal consistency (Chronbach’s α 
of .88) and one month test-retest correlation (r = .89). Subsequent research found similar 
adequate reliability and validity (Beretvas, Meyers, & Leite, 2002; Loo & Thorpe, 2000; Tatman, 
Swogger, Love, & Cook, 2009). Cronbach’s α estimates for the current study were .63 
(attribution subscale) and .69 (denial subscale).     
Adapted Hostile Attribution Bias Vignettes  
The Hostile Attribution Bias Vignettes measure was adapted from Lobbestael, Cima, and 
Arntz (2013) to improve internal consistency to more acceptable levels (Appendix V). Alpha 
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coefficients greater than .70 are generally considered acceptable (DeVellis, 2012; Nunnally, 
1970, 1978). The original vignettes used by Lobbestael and colleagues consisted of ten vignettes, 
eight of which were originally borrowed from two previous studies (Cima, Lobbestael, & 
Vancleef, 2012; Tremblay & Belchevski, 2004). Lobbestael et al. (2013) reported they excluded 
two of the ten vignettes due to poor hostile interpretation utility (see Appendix VI for the eight 
remaining vignettes). Vignettes were presented with closed and open answer sections to measure 
hostile attribution bias. Alpha coefficients for each closed answer options were generally low 
(negative: α = -.13; positive; α = .52; neutral; α = .63; hostile; α = .76; Lobbestael et al., 2013). 
Kappa estimates between two raters for the open answer section was reportedly high (.95; 
Lobbestael et al., 2013).    
The Hostile Attribution Bias Vignettes measure is a novel and likely useful means to 
measure hostile attribution bias in a judgment-based manner. The adapted measure for this study 
included seven items (honed from the eight remaining items used in Lobbestael et al., 2013, 
eliminating a relatively redundant item), containing short vignettes depicting ambiguously 
provocative situations. The situations were edited for greater clarity and general plausibility (e.g., 
more likely to be experienced by more people). For example, the item ‘You walk through the 
street where three boys are playing street hockey’ was changed to ‘You walk down a street 
where teenage boys are hanging out’.    
Four possible interpretations of each situation were presented and participants were asked 
to rate the likelihood of those interpretations on a 4-point rating scale (1 = very unlikely; 2 = 
somewhat unlikely; 3 = neutral; 4 = somewhat likely; 5 = very likely) with regard to the original 
four classifications contained in the measure: hostile, negative, positive, and neutral. Four 
possible interpretations for each of the seven vignettes yielded a total of 28 items that were 
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presented randomly within the survey. Each set of interpretive responses were added to yield 
four scale scores. The four different interpretative responses to the ambiguous situations were 
also edited to enhance clarity and general plausibility. Items were added to make up 4 subscales 
(hostile, negative, positive, and neutral). Cronbach’s α estimates for the current study were .77 
for the hostile subscale, .57 for the negative subscale, .58 for the neutral subscale, and .57 for the 
positive subscale.  
Further, a Principle components factor analysis (described in detail below in the results 
section), indicated that only the hostile and negative subscales had utility. While it was justified 
to use all seven items in the hostile subscale, the factor analysis indicated that only three items 
were represented in the relevant factor for the negative subscale. When including only those 
three items, the negative subscale alpha coefficient rose to .70, which justified the use of the 
reduced subscale in the present analyses. As the neutral and positive subscales were not of 
interest in the original set of hypotheses, they were not included in the present analyses.  
Demographics Survey 
Each participant completed a short demographic survey (Appendix VII). For example, 
some questions assessed sex of the participant, age, and race. 
Data Analyses 
 A principle components factor analysis was conducted to assess the factor structure of the 
Adapted Hostile Attribution Bias measure. Bivariate correlations were conducted to assess 
relationships among all key variables and specific subscales (Hypothesis 1). Two separate 
hierarchical, linear regressions were conducted to assess the predictive strength of trait anger 
rumination and trait general rumination on hostile attribution bias hostile and negative subscales 
(Hypothesis 2). In order to evaluate the relationship between brooding, reflective pondering, and 
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hostile attribution bias, a hierarchical linear regression was conducted (Hypothesis 3). Both 
brooding and reflective pondering were entered into the same model to determine if brooding 
had a stronger relationship with hostile attribution bias. In order to evaluate the potential 
conditional effect of sex on the association between trait rumination and hostile attribution bias 
(Hypothesis 4), a macro developed by Hayes (2013) was used to conduct a conditional effect 
analysis via SPSS (IBM Corp., 2010).  
Anger may be one negative emotion that increases the risk of socially desirable response 
bias. If an individual is currently angry, his or her responses may be more severe than those who 
are not currently angry. Therefore, both social desirability and state anger were statistically 
controlled in all hierarchical linear regression analyses.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
Preliminary Analyses 
Principle components factor analysis 
A Principle components factor analysis was conducted to determine if items within the 
four subscales of the Adapted Hostile Attribution Bias measure distinguished themselves as 
separate factors. An Eigenvalue cut-off of 1.0 was utilized to initially screen for factors to be 
examined, as this is a commonly accepted value (Matsunaga, 2010). Eight factors met criteria. 
However, a visual inspection of the Scree Plot (see Figure 3), showed only the first three factors 
stood out as distinctive from the rest, where these had Eigenvalues of 5.06, 2.53, and 2.21, 
respectively. The rest grouped tightly and indistinctly between Eigenvalues of 1.36 and 1.0. 
Thus, only the first three factors were considered as unique enough to warrant further analysis.  
 
Figure 3. Factor Analytic Scree Plot of Adapted Hostile Attribution Bias Items 
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Individual item factor loading cut-offs were set at .40, which is generally considered the 
lowest acceptable threshold (Matsunaga, 2010). The factor-loading values for all items in the 
first three factors are presented in Table 1. Of the three factors examined, the first was a 'hostile' 
factor which had the strongest support in terms of constituting a stand-alone subscale, consisting 
of all seven of the originally conceived hostile-related items. It also contained two negative items 
(#1 and #6, in the originally conceived negative subscale) at factor loadings of .55 and .56, 
respectively. As these were not consistent with the originally conceived hostile-related items, and 
as they were also represented at roughly equal loadings on the third factor (.55 and .57, 
respectively), they were excluded from the hostile subscale scores.  
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Table 1. Factor loadings for the Adapted Hostile Attribution Bias Measure 
 Components 
Variable 1.  2.  3.  
AHAB_1hos *0.57   0.34  -0.12 
AHAB_1neg ‡0.55   0.01 *0.55 
AHAB_1neu  -0.54   0.09   0.25 
AHAB_1pos  -0.60   0.20   0.00 
AHAB_2hos *0.53   0.37  -0.19 
AHAB_2neg   0.24   0.21   0.19 
AHAB_2neu  -0.45  -0.17 ‡0.40 
AHAB_2pos  -0.12 *0.48  -0.02 
AHAB_3hos *0.52   0.38  -0.31 
AHAB_3neg   0.17   0.17   0.19 
AHAB_3neu  -0.33   0.08 ‡0.42 
AHAB_3pos  -0.40   0.10   0.26 
AHAB_4hos *0.58   0.18  -0.02 
AHAB_4neg   0.32  -0.01 *0.52 
AHAB_4neu  -0.41 ‡0.45   0.01 
AHAB_4pos  -0.22 *0.44   0.01 
AHAB_5hos *0.48   0.38  -0.30 
AHAB_5neg  -0.21   0.14   0.36 
AHAB_5neu  -0.15   0.24   0.28 
AHAB_5pos  -0.24 *0.41   0.14 
AHAB_6hos *0.64   0.26   0.15 
AHAB_6neg ‡0.56  -0.04 *0.57 
AHAB_6neu  -0.35 ‡0.41   0.05 
AHAB_6pos  -0.53   0.16  -0.03 
AHAB_7hos *0.51   0.09 ‡0.43 
AHAB_7neg   0.08   0.35   0.29 
AHAB_7neu  -0.49 ‡0.41   0.05 
AHAB_7pos  -0.13 *0.59  -0.17 
Note.  N = 371. AHAB_Neg=Adapted Hostile Attribution Bias Negative Subscale; 
AHAB_Neu=Adapted Hostile Attribution Bias Neutral Subscale; AHAB_Hos=Adapted Hostile 
Attribution Bias Hostile Subscale; AHAB_Pos=Adapted Hostile Attribution Bias Positive 
Subscale. *Items of consistent representation from originally conceived subscales. ‡ Items of 
inconsistent representation from originally conceived subscales. 
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The second factor had seven items meeting the .40 threshold, but these items were mixed 
in content, with four positive and three neutral items. Thus, there was no clear interpretation of 
this factor, casting doubt on their utility as independent subscales. Items from these positive and 
neutral subscales were not included in the original hypotheses.  
The third factor did present interpretation problems, as it consisted of six items meeting 
the .40 loading threshold, where three were negative, two were neutral, and one was hostile. The 
latter hostile item (#7) was more strongly represented in the first factor (.51 vs. .43) in which it 
was also consistent with originally conceived items; therefore, it was thus included in the hostile 
subscale scores. When ignoring the hostile and the two neutral items, the three negative subscale 
items within the third factor, yielded an alpha coefficient of .70, indicating a likely utility for 
including the negative subscale with this reduced number of items. 
Analysis of variance analyses  
ANOVAs were conducted to determine if there were significant differences between 
participants excluded, based on time and missing data, and included in the primary analyses. 
Results of the ANOVAs indicated that there were significant differences between the excluded 
and included participants for the following variables: Anger Rumination Scale (F(1,488) = 5.86, 
p = .02, η2 = .01); State Anger Subscale (F(1,495) = 97.99, p < .001, η2 = .17); Trait Anger 
Subscale (F(1,489) = 5.89, p = .02, η2 = .01); Social Desirability Attribution Subscale (F(1,502) 
= 237.09, p < .001, η2 = .32); Hostile Attribution Bias Hostile Subscale (F(1,492) = 86.49, p < 
.001, η2 = .15); Hostile Attribution Bias Positive Subscale (F(1,493) = 53.393, p < .001, η2 = 
.10); Hostile Attribution Bias Negative Subscale (F(1,497) = 11.26, p < .01, η2 = 02); Hostile 
Attribution Bias Neutral Subscale (F(1,493) = 227.06, p < .001, η2 = .32). No significant 
differences between excluded and included participants were found for Ruminative Response 
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Scale (F(1,492) = .13, p = .72, η2 < .001); Brooding Subscale (F(1,489) = .16, p = .69, η2 < 
.001); Reflective Pondering Subscale (F(1,490) = .62, p = .43, η2 < .01); or the Anger Expression 
Inventory (F(1,496) = 0.53, p = .47, η2 < .01). It appeared for many of these scales, the excluded 
participants had higher mean scores than included participants; however, this may have been due 
to increased chance of random or dishonest responding. Due to the potential for invalid or 
unreliable responding in excluded participants, all primary analyses were conducted using the 
participants who did not meet exclusion criteria.       
Relationships Among Variables 
Bivariate correlations, internal consistency estimates, and descriptive statistics for the 
main variables of interest are presented in Table 2. Trait anger scores were significantly and 
positively correlated with trait rumination scores, as measured by both the Ruminative Response 
Scale (r = .38, p < .01) and Anger Rumination Scale (r = .58, p < .01), lending support to 
Hypothesis 1.     
Hypothesis 2 was supported; anger rumination scores significantly predicted hostile 
interpretation subscale scores, controlling for state anger and social desirability attribution scores 
(Table 3). Anger rumination scores significantly predicted negative interpretation subscale 
scores, controlling for state anger and social desirability attribution scores (Table 4). General 
rumination scores significantly predicted hostile interpretation subscale scores, controlling for 
state anger and social desirability attribution scores (Table 5). General rumination scores 
significantly predicted negative interpretation subscale scores, controlling for state anger and 
social desirability attribution scores (Table 6). 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations  
Variable M SD 1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  7.  8.  9.  10.  11.  12.  
1. RRS 47.89 15.59 (.95)            
2. RRS_B 11.44 4.01 .89** (.85)           
3. RRS_R 10.26 3.92 .86** .67** (.83)          
4. ARS 38.43 12.72 .58** .55** .51** (.94)         
5. SDS_Att 25.25 2.96  .12*  .12*  .03  .22** (.63)        
6. SAS 11.99 4.17 .32** .27** .28** .31** -.01 (.91)       
7. TAS 19.69 5.76 .38** .36** .31** .58**  .22** .33** (.85)      
8. AES 57.89 6.77 .33** .29** .26** .34**  .03  .07 .23** (.57)     
9. AHAB_Hos 14.62 4.97 .26** .29** .21** .27** -.03 .27** .26** .11** (.77)    
10. AHAB_Neg 9.36 2.86 .36** .35** .25** .33**  .18**  .11* .25** .22** .40** (.57)   
11. AHAB_Neu 25.59 4.35 -.09 -.11* -.04 -.10* -.05 -.16** -.20** .01 -.43* -.18** (.58)  
12. AHAB_Pos 22.60 4.39 -.13* -.14** -.07 -.15** -.25** -.11* -.20** -.04 -.21** -.31** .55** (.57) 
Note.  N = 371.  Figures in parentheses are α coefficients.  RRS=Ruminative Response Scale; RRS_B=Brooding Subscale; 
RRS_R=Reflective Pondering Subscale; ARS=Anger Rumination Scale; SDS=Social Desirability Attribution Subscale; SAS=State Anger 
Subscale; TAS=Trait Anger Subscale; AES=Anger Expression Scale; AHAB_Hos=Adapted Hostile Attribution Bias Hostile Subscale; 
AHAB_Neg=Adapted Hostile Attribution Bias Negative Subscale; AHAB_Neu=Adapted Hostile Attribution Bias Neutral Subscale; 
AHAB_Pos=Adapted Hostile Attribution Bias Positive Subscale. 
*p < .05, **p<.01 
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Table 3. 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Trait Anger 
Rumination Predicting Hostile Interpretations 
Variable B SD t p-value 
Model 1     
Social Desirability -.27 .07 -4.13 < .001 
State Anger  .25 .04  5.92 < .001 
Model 2     
Social Desirability -.30 .06 -4.67 < .001 
State Anger  .18 .04  4.11 < .001 
Anger Rumination  .09 .02  4.62 < .001 
Note. Model 1 R
2
 = .13; ΔR2 = .13; Model 2 R2 = .16; ΔR2 = .04; 
Collinearity Statistic Tolerance for Anger Rumination= .88 
 
Table 4. 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Trait Anger 
Rumination Predicting Negative Interpretations 
Variable B SD t p-value 
Model 1     
Social Desirability .14 .04 4.14 < .001 
State Anger .04 .02 1.95  .05 
Model 2     
Social Desirability .13 .03 3.69 < .001 
State Anger .00 .02   .08  .94 
Anger Rumination .05 .01 5.32 < .001 
Note. Model 1 R
2
 = .04; ΔR2 = .04; Model 2 R2 = .09; ΔR2 = .05; 
Collinearity Statistic Tolerance for Anger Rumination = .88 
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Table 5. 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Trait General 
Rumination Predicting Hostile Interpretations 
Variable B SD t p-value 
Model 1     
Social Desirability -.27 .07 -4.17 < .001 
State Anger  .25 .04  5.98 < .001 
Model 2     
Social Desirability -.29 .06 -4.55 < .001 
State Anger  .20 .04  4.57 < .001 
General Rumination  .06 .02  3.64 < .001 
Note. Model 1 R
2
 = .13; ΔR2 = .13; Model 2 R2 = .15; ΔR2 = .02; 
Collinearity Statistic Tolerance for General Rumination = .90 
 
Table 6. 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Trait General 
Rumination Predicting Negative Interpretations 
Variable B SD t p-value 
Model 1     
Social Desirability  .14 .04   4.14 < .001 
State Anger  .04 .02   1.99   .05 
Model 2     
Social Desirability  .12 .03   3.64 < .001 
State Anger -.01 .02   -.21  .83 
General Rumination  .05 .01   6.71 < .001 
Note. Model 1 R
2
 = .04; ΔR2 = .04; Model 2 R2 = .12; ΔR2 = .08; 
Collinearity Statistic Tolerance for General Rumination = .90 
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Both brooding and reflective pondering scores were simultaneously entered into the 
regression equation (and controlling for state anger and social desirability attribution scores), to 
examine whether brooding exhibited stronger relationships with hostile attribution bias compared 
to reflective pondering. Lending support to Hypothesis 3, the brooding subscale scores 
significantly predicted hostile interpretation subscale scores, while the reflective pondering 
subscale scores did not significantly predict hostile attribution bias (Table 7). Also included in 
the model was state anger, which was significant, and social desirability, which was non-
significant.            
Table 7. 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Brooding and 
Reflective Pondering Predicting Hostile Interpretations 
Variable B SD t p-value 
Model 1     
Social Desirability -.28 .07 -4.25 < .001 
State Anger  .25 .04  5.90 < .001 
Model 2     
Social Desirability -.31 .07 -4.76 < .001 
State Anger  .21 .04  4.73 < .001 
Brooding  .28 .08  3.34     < .01 
Reflective Pondering  -.04 .08  -.50   .62 
Note. Model 1 R
2
 = .13; ΔR2 = .13; Model 2 R2 = .16; ΔR2 = .03; 
Collinearity Statistic Tolerance for Brooding = .93; Collinearity 
Statistic Tolerance for Reflective Pondering = .92 
 
Conditional Effect Analyses 
 The full model regression model was significant (F(5,365) = 10.25, p < .001, R
2
 = .12). 
Trait anger rumination was significantly related to the hostile subscale of the Adapted Hostile 
Attribution Bias measure (t(365) = 3.15, p < .01, b = .08, SE = .03); however, neither sex (t(365) 
= -.48, p = .63, b = -.78, SE = 1.63) nor the interaction between sex and trait anger rumination 
(t(365) = .85, p = .39, b = .04, SE = .04) were significant. Hypothesis 4 was thus not supported 
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because conditional effects of trait anger rumination on hostile attribution bias, based on sex, 
were not significant.    
Exploratory Analyses 
Given commonly observed sex differences in previous studies (i.e., basis for Hypothesis 
4), exploratory ANOVA analyses were conducted to examine the non-significant results for 
effects of trait anger rumination scores on hostile interpretation subscale scores conditional to the 
sex of the participant. Results of the exploratory ANOVAs indicated that there were no 
significant differences between the males and females for the Anger Rumination Scale (F(1,370) 
= 3.11, p = .08, η2 = .01); State Anger Subscale (F(1,370) = 0.11, p = .74, η2 < .01); Trait Anger 
Subscale (F(1,370) = 0.73, p = .40, η2 < .01); or the Hostile Attribution Bias Hostile Subscale 
(F(1,370) = 0.44, p = .51, η2 < .01). Interestingly, significant differences for sex were found for 
the Social Desirability Scale (F(1,370) = 5,97, p = .02, η2 = .02), as females reported more social 
desirability bias than males (female M = 25.50, SD = 2.96; male M = 24.69, SD = 2.89).   
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CHAPTER 5  
DISCUSSION 
 According to the ICM, hostile interpretation biases are hypothesized to influence anger in 
two different ways: 1) some individuals are more vigilant to recognizing and processing hostile 
information or 2) some individuals have pre-existing hostile interpretations that are reinforced 
(Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008, 2010). Many previous studies that utilized experimental 
methodologies with visual search tasks suggested that high trait anger individuals are able to 
identify hostile words more quickly and tend to interpret ambiguous situations as more hostile 
compared to low trait anger individuals (e.g., Putman et al., 2004; Smith & Waterman, 2003, 
2004, Wilkowski et al., 2007). Few studies tested the ICM's second hypothesis with a more 
direct link between trait rumination and hostile interpretation biases (e.g., Bushman, 2002). The 
current study supports and builds upon the ICM, such that individuals high in trait rumination 
(i.e., more prone to experiencing pre-existing hostile interpretations) are more likely to 
experience hostile attribution bias in ambiguous situations.    
The current research study supported usage for a hostile attribution bias measure in 
survey-based studies as well as observed the relationships between trait rumination, trait anger, 
and hostile attribution bias. This author examined conditional effects of sex on hostile attribution 
bias. The adapted hostile attribution bias measure had significantly improved psychometrics and 
appeared to be a fairly reliable method in assessing hostile attribution bias (i.e., hostile 
interpretations), though only the hostile and negative subscales had adequate reliability (α > .70). 
A closer examination of the measure via a confirmatory factor analysis revealed that the 'hostile' 
subscale was the most valid and useful. The 'positive' and 'neutral' subscales, and to a lesser 
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extent the 'negative' subscale, were less reliable and effective in measuring non-hostile factors 
that may have been used as alternative interpretations and comparison to the 'hostile' subscale.  
As expected, trait anger was significantly and positively related to trait rumination, 
though anger rumination had a stronger relationship with trait anger (r = .58) compared to trait 
general rumination (r = .38). The differences between the correlation coefficients for anger 
rumination and general rumination were statistically significant (z = 3.56; p < .001). Anger 
rumination may have been more strongly associated with trait anger due to shared variance 
related to an underlying anger construct. These results were consistent with previous studies 
suggesting that individuals high in trait anger have a tendency to angrily ruminate more often 
than those with low trait anger (e.g., Wilkowski et al., 2007). According to the ICM, those with 
higher trait anger will focus on the anger-provoking event (i.e., ruminate on it), exacerbating and 
prolonging an angry mood state and putting the individual at higher risk of engaging in 
aggressive behaviors (Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008, 2010).  
Further, the Wilkowski and colleagues posit in the ICM that there are many cognitive 
factors that influence anger in addition to rumination, one of which is called hostile attribution 
bias (Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008, 2010). The current study supported the conclusion that 
rumination scores significantly predicted hostile and negative interpretations of ambiguous 
situations adapted from vignettes used in previous research (Lobbestael et al., 2013). Individuals 
high in trait general rumination, as well as specifically, trait anger rumination had a tendency to 
perceive ambiguous situations as hostile or negative, suggesting that they are more likely to 
experience hostile attribution bias compared to individuals low in trait anger rumination. 
Rumination was a unique predictor of this bias toward a hostile perception, even when 
controlling for current angry mood state or positive response bias.  
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Though historically, many studies describe rumination as a maladaptive cognitive process 
that exacerbates or prolongs emotional experiences (e.g., depression, anxiety, or anger), it can 
also have advantages for processing information and be adaptive to alleviating negative emotions 
(Treynor et al., 2003). The more common maladaptive type of rumination, called brooding, is 
characterized by a focus on the causes of negative symptoms or 'why' the individual feels the 
way they do, while a more adaptive rumination is called reflective pondering. Reflective 
pondering occurs when an individual consistently focuses on 'how' an emotional event occurs or 
aspects the individual can change to alleviate negative symptoms.  
In the current study, brooding was significantly more predictive of hostile attribution bias 
compared to reflective pondering, so much so that reflective pondering was not a significant 
predictor. According to Treynor and colleagues, brooding is more maladaptive than its reflective 
pondering because individuals engaging in this type of cognitive process tends to focus on 
aspects of a situation that are beyond their control, which may lead to more negative 
interpretations of the provoking event, leading to prolonged and exacerbated emotional 
experiences (Treynor et al., 2003). Results from the current study were consistent with 
Bushman's (2002) findings, in which anger rumination was linked to increased likelihood of an 
individual automatically interpreting a situation as hostile. It may be that when an individual 
continuously ruminates about 'why' an event occurs as well as the symptoms and causes of a 
negative emotional response, a type of priming effect for hostile interpretations is more likely to 
occur. Upon interpreting the situation as hostile, the individual may ruminate further about the 
triggering events and feel angrier or potentially aggressive.  
 Many studies have previously found that males tend to report more anger and engage in 
anger rumination more often than females (e.g., Bushman, 2002), while females tend to report 
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more depression or depressive rumination (e.g., Watkins, 2004). Thus, it was expected that trait 
anger rumination would be more predictive of hostile attribution bias in males compared to 
females. However, conditional effects of sex of the participant were not significant in the current 
study. Exploratory analyses confirmed there were no significant sex differences observed in trait 
anger rumination, trait anger, and hostile attribution bias; however, significant differences were 
found for social desirability with females scoring higher than males on the Social Desirability 
Scale. The non-significant results for conditional effects of sex may have been due to uneven 
sample sizes for males and females, as there were over twice as many females in the current 
sample; however, only sixty-seven males were excluded from the original sample for taking the 
surveys in a short period of time or declining to answer many of the items. Power analyses 
indicated there was sufficient power (power > .99) to detect sex differences, if they were present, 
independent from the exclusion of those sixty-seven males.   
Limitations 
 All cognitive and emotional processes were predominately self-report and trait-based in 
nature and measured via surveys online, rather than observable behaviors at multiple points in 
time. Some researchers have found that certain cognitive processes or behaviors are only 
available during an active emotional state (e.g., Tice & Baumeister, 1993). Individuals who 
experience anger and rumination in the moment may perceive and respond differently to 
ambiguous situations compared to those presented in vignettes. Measuring anger-related 
thoughts or behaviors via self-report allows participants to potentially present themselves in 
more socially-desirable ways. Though the current study attempted to control for this with a social 
desirability measure, methodologies that utilize immediate observation or provocation of 
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emotional states may allow for more objective results of anger, anger rumination, and hostile 
attribution bias.    
 The cross-sectional design of the study may also reduce conclusions that can be made 
based on the results. Some limitations of cross-sectional designs are related to determining 
directionality and cause-and-effect. For example, the current study found support for a 
relationship between trait rumination and hostile interpretations; however, the direction of the 
relationship cannot be determined without more experimental methodologies. In addition, cause-
and-effect conclusions cannot be made with a cross-sectional design. In other words, future 
studies may utilize more experimental methods to determine if rumination 'causes' hostile 
interpretations in high trait anger individuals.   
Another potential limitation to the current results is related to the sample. Participants 
were largely recruited from a southern university and may not represent the population in other 
geographical locations or non-college settings. In addition, preliminary results found that 
individuals who were excluded from the study reported more trait anger rumination, state or trait 
anger, and hostile attribution bias. Participants who took the surveys in a short-amount of time 
may have randomly or dishonestly responded, potentially resulting in inaccurate information 
regarding their actual experience with anger, rumination, and hostile interpretations. In addition, 
participants who declined to answer 75% or more of the items were excluded from the analyses, 
as they may have responded in an inconsistent manner. Some of the measures used in this study 
had a limited number of items, such that any missing data (i.e., participants declining to answer 
any given item), may significantly reduce the reliability of the measures and increase the 
likelihood of inaccurate data. The sample used in this research may under-represent anger in the 
population due to excluding the most trait angry individuals most prone to anger rumination and 
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hostile attribution bias. The extent to which the sample is not representative of anger in the 
population may be small due to the excluded group also being the most likely to be randomly 
respond, answer in a way that may be more dishonest, or have low frustration tolerance while 
completing the surveys. 
 As seen in Tables 3-7, there was relatively high amount of collinearity (greater than .80) 
between trait anger and general rumination with state anger, social desirability, and hostile and 
negative interpretations. High amount of collinearity suggests there may have been some shared 
variance between the variables, in turn over-representing the strength of the relationships among 
the variables. However, relationships among these variables was expected due to some of the 
variables (e.g., anger rumination, state anger, or hostile interpretations) measuring similar 
constructs of anger. Correlation coefficients for hostile interpretations (i.e., the hostile subscale 
of the AHAB) with both anger rumination (r = .27) and state anger (r = .27) were small, 
suggesting each variable may measure unique aspects of anger not accounted for in other 
measures.   
Implications 
 Results from the current study provide evidence for the predictive qualities of trait anger 
rumination and brooding on hostile attribution bias. Further, results provide a self-report measure 
of hostile attribution bias that has great utility for survey-based research. Those prone to 
rumination may be more likely to perceive situations as hostile, in turn potentially priming the 
individual for anger and aggressive behaviors. Reducing rumination and increasing executive 
functioning and reappraisal processes may decrease hostile attribution bias and risk of aggressive 
behaviors. In other words, rumination may be targeted as a treatment goal to reduce the impact of 
anger in rumination- and anger-prone individuals.  
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Reappraisal and distraction were found to be effective techniques in reducing rumination 
with small to moderate effect sizes (Denson et al., 2012b), while anger treatments related to 
cognitive restructuring and relaxation had moderate effect sizes (Edmondson & Conger, 1996). 
Recognizing triggers to rumination and anger as well as indicators of when an individual is 
ruminating in the moment may help reduce hostile attribution bias before it exacerbates the anger 
experience. For example, if an individual is able to recognize when he or she is ruminating early 
in the process, reappraisal processes may be more readily activated. Attention may then be 
directed toward non-hostile information in the triggering event to reduce hostile perceptions.     
Future Directions 
 Future research may further our understanding of rumination and hostile attribution bias 
through more objective, experimental methods. More objective methodologies, such as having an 
individual actively ruminate after provocation and measure immediate perceptions in live, 
simulated ambiguously hostile situations, may be beneficial. In addition, priming effects of 
rumination on anger may also be helpful to observe whether hostile attribution bias is stronger in 
those primed to ruminate. Future studies may also potentially improve upon and further 
strengthen the psychometric properties of the adapted hostile attribution bias measure.    
Conclusion 
 Understanding the role of rumination in anger and hostile attribution bias processes was 
expanded with the present study. Previous research has focused on the relationship between trait 
anger and hostile attribution bias; however, many studies used visual search tasks to measure 
hostile attribution bias, such as a searching for hostile words using variations of a spatial probe 
task (e.g.,Smith & Waterman, 2003, 2004), searching for angry facial expressions (Putman, 
Hermans, & van Honk, 2004), or using a Stroop task (Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). 
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Another study by Wilkowski et al. (2007) utilized eye-tracking software that provided further 
evidence of the relationship between hostile attribution bias and trait anger.  
Despite the various visual stimuli-dependent methods to measuring hostile attribution 
bias, Wilkowski and Robinson (2008) suggested that using such visual search tasks to measure 
hostile attribution bias may be problematic due to the stimuli bearing little resemblance to daily 
life encounters. In addition, VanRullen and colleagues found that many individuals tend to 
extract "gist" interpretations prior to attending to specific stimuli within any given situation (e.g., 
VanRullen & Thorne, 2011). Other research on trait anger focused on its relationship to trait 
rumination (e.g., Berry et al., 2005; Siewert et al., 2011; Sukhodolsky et al., 2001) or examined 
state anger and rumination (Bushman, 2002), yet these studies lacked direct measures of hostile 
attribution bias.  
The current study provided an adapted self-report measure of hostile attribution bias was 
shown to be a reliable tool for survey-based research. The adapted hostile attribution bias 
measure addressed some of the limitations of other visually-dependent measures utilized in 
previous research. The adapted hostile attribution bias measure, supported here, utilized vignettes 
that described a variety of real-life scenarios. Results from the current study provided evidence 
of a direct relationship between trait rumination (i.e., general and anger specific) and hostile 
attribution bias, while trait rumination did not exhibit significant effects on hostile attribution 
bias based on gender. In other words, male and females who reported more trait rumination were 
equally likely to experience hostile attribution bias. A more maladaptive-type of rumination, 
called brooding, was found to be more predictive of hostile attribution bias than its more 
adaptive counter-part, reflective pondering.  
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Results found in this study contribute to our understanding of anger and rumination and 
were consistent with the Integrative Cognitive Model of anger; individuals prone to ruminate are 
more likely to perceive ambiguous situations as more hostile. Future studies may utilize the 
adapted hostile attribution bias measure in conjunction with experimental methods (e.g., 
inducing individuals to ruminate or distract and/or provoke anger) to observe whether the results 
presented in this study are externally valid. It may be the case that individuals who are angry and 
actively ruminate are even more prone to hostile attribution bias. In addition, future studies may 
examine ways to reduce an individual's risk of ruminating and engaging in subsequent hostile 
perceptions in ambiguously hostile situations. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory 
Directions: A number of statements people use to describe themselves are given below.  Read 
each statement and then circle the number which indicates how you feel right now.  Remember 
there are no right or wrong answers.  Do not spend too much time on any one statement, but give 
the answer which seems to best describe your present feelings. 
How I Feel Right Now 
       Not At All      Somewhat     Moderately  Very Much So 
1) I am furious.   1  2  3  4 
2) I feel irritated. 1  2  3  4 
3) I feel angry. 1  2  3  4 
4) I feel like yelling  
    at somebody.  1  2  3  4 
5) I feel like breaking  
    things.  1  2  3  4 
6) I am mad.  1  2  3  4 
7) I feel like banging 
     on the table.  1  2  3  4 
8) I feel like hitting 
    someone.  1  2  3  4 
9) I am burned up. 1  2  3  4 
10) I feel like  
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      swearing.  1  2  3  4 
 
Directions: A number of statements people use to describe themselves are given below.  Read 
each statement and then circle the number which indicates how you generally feel.  Remember 
there are no right or wrong answers.  Do not spend too much time on any one statement, but give 
the answer which seems to best describe how you generally feel. 
How I Generally Feel 
        Almost Never    Sometimes          Often   Almost Always 
11) I am quick tempered.  1  2  3  4 
12) I have a fiery temper. 1  2  3  4 
13) I am a hotheaded person. 1  2  3  4 
14) I get angry when I’m 
      slowed down by others’  
      mistakes.   1  2  3  4 
15) I feel annoyed when I am  
      not given recognition for 
      doing good work.  1  2  3  4 
16) I fly off the handle.   1  2  3  4 
17) When I get mad, I say 
      nasty things.   1  2  3  4 
18) It makes me furious when  
      I am criticized in front of  
      others.   1  2  3  4 
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19) When I get frustrated, I 
      feel like hitting someone. 1  2  3  4 
20) I feel infuriated when I  
      do a good job and get a 
      poor evaluation.    1  2  3  4 
 
Directions: Everyone feels angry or furious from time to time, but people differ in the ways that 
they react when they are angry.  A number of statements are listed below which people use to 
describe their reactions when they feel angry or furious.  Read each statement and then circle 
the number which indicates how often you generally react or behave in the manner described 
when you are feeling angry or furious.  Remember that there are no right or wrong answers.  
Do not spend too much time on any one statement. 
When Angry Or Furious… 
        Almost Never    Sometimes          Often   Almost Always 
21) I control my temper.  1  2  3  4 
22) I express my anger.   1  2  3  4 
23) I keep things in.   1  2  3  4 
24) I am patient with others.  1  2  3  4 
25) I pout or sulk.   1  2  3  4 
26) I withdraw from people. 1  2  3  4 
27) I make sarcastic remarks 
      to others.   1  2  3  4 
28) I keep my cool.   1  2  3  4 
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29) I do things like slam doors.  1  2  3  4 
30) I boil inside, but I don’t 
      show it.   1  2  3  4 
31) I control my behavior.  1  2  3  4 
32) I argue with others.   1  2  3  4 
33) I tend to harbor grudges 
      that I don’t tell anyone 
      about.   1  2  3  4 
34) I strike out at whatever 
      infuriates me.  1  2  3  4 
35) I can stop myself from  
      losing my temper.  1  2  3  4 
36) I am secretly quite 
      critical of others.   1  2  3  4 
37) I am angrier than I am 
      willing to admit.  1  2  3  4 
38) I calm down faster than 
      most other people. 1  2  3  4 
39) I say nasty things.   1  2  3  4 
40) I try to be tolerant and 
      understanding.  1  2  3  4 
41) I’m irritated a great deal 
      more than people are  
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      aware of.   1  2  3  4 
42) I lose my temper.   1  2  3  4 
43) If someone annoys me, 
      I’m apt to tell him or her 
      how I feel.   1  2  3  4 
44) I control my angry feelings.  1  2  3  4 
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Appendix B 
Anger Rumination Scale 
Directions: Please read through the items below and select how frequently you engage in the 
following: 
1. I ruminate about my past anger experiences 
1-----------------2---------------3--------------4 
Almost  Never                              Almost Always 
2. I ponder about the injustices that have been done to me 
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
            Almost  Never               Almost Always 
3. I keep thinking about events that angered me for a long time 
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
      Almost  Never               Almost Always 
4. I have long living fantasies of revenge after the conflict is over 
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
5. I think about certain events from a long time ago and they still make me angry 
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
6. I have difficulty forgiving people who have hurt me 
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
7. After an argument is over, I keep fighting with this person in my imagination 
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1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
8. Memories of being aggravated pop up into my mind before I fall asleep 
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
9. Whenever I experience anger, I keep thinking about it for a while 
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
10. I have had times when I could not stop being preoccupied with a particular conflict 
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
11. I analyze events that make me angry 
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
12. I think about the reasons people treat me badly 
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
13. I have day dreams and fantasies of violent nature 
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
14. I feel angry about certain things in my life 
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
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15. When someone makes me angry I can’t stop thinking about how to get back at this person 
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
16. When someone provokes me, I keep wondering why this should have happened to me 
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
17. Memories of even minor annoyances bother me for a while 
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
18. When something makes me angry, I turn this matter over and over again in my mind 
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
19. I re-enact the anger episode in my mind after it has happened 
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
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Appendix C 
Ruminative Response Scale 
Directions: Please read through the items below and select how frequently you engage in the 
following: 
1. Think about how alone you feel  
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
2. Think “I won’t be able to do my job if I don’t snap out of this.”  
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
3. Think about your feelings of fatigue and achiness  
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
4. Think about how hard it is to concentrate  
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
5. Think “What am I doing to deserve this?”  
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
6. Think about how passive and unmotivated you feel  
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
7. Analyze recent events to try to understand why you are depressed  
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1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
8. Think about how you don’t seem to feel anything anymore  
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
9. Think “Why can’t I get going?”  
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
10. Think “Why do I always react this way?”  
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
11. Go away by yourself and think about why you feel this way  
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
12. Write down what you are thinking and analyze it  
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
13. Think about a recent situation, wishing it had gone better  
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
14. Think “I won’t be able to concentrate if I keep feeling this way.”  
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
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15. Think “Why do I have problems other people don’t have?”  
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
16. Think “Why can’t I handle things better?”  
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
17. Think about how sad you feel  
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
18. Think about all your shortcomings, failings, faults, mistakes  
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
19. Think about how you don’t feel up to doing anything  
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
20. Analyze your personality to try to understand why you are depressed 
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
21. Go someplace alone to think about your feelings  
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
Almost  Never               Almost Always 
22. Think about how angry you are with yourself  
1-----------------2---------------3---------------4 
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Almost  Never               Almost Always 
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Appendix D 
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale 
Directions: Read each item and decide whether it is true (T) or false (F) for you. Try to work 
rapidly and answer each question by clicking on the T or the F.  
1. T F Before voting I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all the candidates.  
2. T F I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble. 
3. T F It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged. 
4. T F I have never intensely disliked anyone.  
5. T F On occasions I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in life. 
6. T F I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t get my way. 
7. T F I am always careful about my manner of dress. 
8. T F My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out in a restaurant. 
9. T F If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I was not seen, I would probably do 
it. 
10. T F On a few occasions, I have given up something because I thought too little of my ability. 
11. T F I like to gossip at times. 
12. T F There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even though I 
knew they were right. 
13. T F No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener. 
14. T F I can remember “playing sick” to get out of something. 
15. T F There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone. 
16. T F I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake. 
17. T F I always try to practice what I preach. 
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18. T F I don’t find it particularly difficult to get along with loudmouthed, obnoxious people. 
19. T F I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. 
20. T F When I don’t know something I don’t mind at all admitting it. 
21. T F I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable. 
22. T F At times I have really insisted on having things my own way. 
23. T F There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things. 
24. T F I would never think of letting someone else be punished for my wrong-doings. 
25. T F I never resent being asked to return a favor. 
26. T F I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own. 
27. T F I never make a long trip without checking the safety of my car. 
28. T F There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others. 
29. T F I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off. 
30. T F I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me. 
31. T F I have never felt that I was punished without cause. 
32. T F I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they only got what they deserved. 
33. T F I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone’s feelings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
78 
Appendix E 
Adapted Hostile Attribution Bias Vignettes 
You will read a number of short descriptions of situations.  We then present you with a possible 
interpretation of each situation and ask you to rate the likelihood those interpretations. 
Very Unlikely     Somewhat Unlikely     Neutral     Somewhat Likely     Very Likely 
 1.      You walk down a street where teenage boys are hanging out. As you pass them, you hear 
them laugh. How likely is it that: 
a.       They were laughing at you (Negative) 
b.      They were joking amongst themselves (Neutral) 
c.       They are trying to provoke a fight with you (Hostile) 
d.      They laugh because they are happy (Positive) 
2.      You are at a club or bar, and a large man bumps into you from behind. How likely is it that: 
a.       He did this to provoke a conflict (Hostile) 
b.      He was not looking where he was going and it happened by accident 
(Neutral) 
c.       The man was not very friendly and just didn’t care whom he bumped 
(Negative) 
d.      The man was trying to be friendly and get your attention, but tripped 
(Positive) 
3.      Kids are playing ball outside your home. The next thing you know your window has been 
broken. How likely is it that: 
a.       These kids are just careless and irresponsible (Negative) 
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b.      These kids remind you that everyone makes mistakes and you forgive them 
(Positive) 
c.       These kids were trying to damage your property on purpose (Hostile) 
d.      These kids just needed a better place to play ball (Neutral) 
4.      Your friends go out for lunch without asking you. How likely is it that: 
a.       They just don’t want you to go with them this time (Negative) 
b.      They are intentionally trying to hurt your feelings (Hostile) 
c.       They know I just don’t like that particular restaurant (Positive) 
d.      They probably thought I already had other plans (Neutral) 
5.      Your car was towed and when you go to pick it up, you notice a dent in the side that you 
had not seen before. How likely is it that: 
a.       The tow truck driver dented it on purpose (Hostile) 
b.      The dent was already there, and you are glad you noticed now so you can 
get it fixed (Positive) 
c.       You can’t determine whether or not it was there before it was towed 
(Neutral) 
d.      It was accidentally dented during the tow, but the driver didn’t notice 
(Negative) 
6.      You are walking in a crowd. You notice a group of people is talking loud and pointing in 
your direction. How likely is it that: 
a.       They are judging you negatively (Negative) 
b.      They are just having a good time and they aren’t pointing at you (Positive) 
c.       They are looking for trouble and trying to provoke you (Hostile) 
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d.      They are talking about someone behind you (Neutral) 
7.      A group of coworkers is sitting together talking. The moment you come in, the 
conversation falls silent.  How likely is it that: 
a.       They are planning a way to recognize you or celebrate something with you 
(Positive) 
b.      They are doing it on purpose because they don’t like you (Hostile) 
c.       They just happened to finish their conversation as you walked in (Neutral) 
d.      They are complaining about work, but don’t want to include you (Negative) 
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Appendix F 
Hostile Attribution Bias Vignettes 
1. You walk through the street where three boys are playing street hockey. As you pass 
them, you hear them laugh. 
a. They were laughing at you (Negative) 
b. They made a joke among themselves (Neutral) 
c. They want to provoke a fight with you (Hostile) 
d. They laugh because they are happy to see you (Positive)  
2. You are at a local dance club. While you are dancing someone bumps into you.  
a. He did this to provoke a fight (Hostile) 
b. He was dancing, it happened by accident (Neutral) 
c. The man was not feeling well and as a consequence he lost his balance and 
bumped into you (Negative)  
d. The man was a friend who tripped over when he greeted you (Positive) 
3. Kids are playing baseball in front of your house. Their ball shoots through your window 
and glass is flying around. 
a. The kids nowadays break everything (Negative) 
b. The kids’ parents have insurance so no harm was done (Positive) 
c. The kids are trying to make me mad on purpose (Hostile) 
d. The kid whose turn it is, is really bad at aiming (Neutral) 
4. You are at a bar and a very drunk man next to you trips over your feet and your drink 
slips out of your hands. 
a. The man is after me, he is up to a fight (Hostile) 
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b. My drink fell out of my hand because he stepped on my feet by accident (Neutral) 
c. The man stepped on my feet because he was pushed by someone else (Negative) 
d. You smile, he reminds you of a nice evening when you had too much to drink 
(Positive)  
5. Your friends go out for lunch without asking you. 
a. They don’t want me with them (Negative) 
b. Those traitors, they want to play a trick on me (Hostile) 
c. We already do enough nice things together (Positive) 
d. They thought I already had other plans (Neutral)  
6. You bring your car to the garage for an oil change. When you come back you see oil 
lying on the floor underneath your car. 
a. Those stupid mechanics want to send me home with a broken car so that I have to 
come back and they can take advantage of me (Hostile) 
b. Your inexperienced nephew refreshed the oil, you are proud that he is working 
here (Positive) 
c. That oil stain was on the ground before (Neutral) 
d. They did not finish and clean up properly (Negative)  
7. You are walking in a very crowded shopping street. You notice that a group of people is 
talking loud and is pointing in your direction. 
a. They point at you because they notice something about your clothes (Negative) 
b. They are happy to see you (Positive) 
c. They do not want you near them and look at you in a threatening way (Hostile) 
d. They talk about someone or someone behind you (Neutral) 
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8. At work a group of your colleagues is sitting together talking. The moment you come in 
the conversation falls silent.  
a. Your colleagues are planning a party for you (Positive) 
b. They are probably criticizing you because they want to put you in a poor light 
(Hostile) 
c. They seem to be finished with the topic they were talking about (Neutral)  
d. Your colleagues are talking about a sad incident, they might want to spare you the 
memory (Negative) 
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Appendix G 
Demographic Survey 
1. Age: ___________ 
2. Race/Ethnicity (Check all that apply): 
□  African American   □  Asian   □  Caucasian (non-Hispanic) 
□  Hispanic   □ Pacific Islander  □ Other ______________________ 
3. Gender:          □ Female  □ Male 
4.  Major: ________________________________ 
5. Year in School:   
□  Freshman   □  Junior  □  Other ________________________ 
□  Sophomore              □  Senior 
6. What is your best estimate of your family’s total combined income over the last year?  
$0 to $14,999 
$15,000 to $24,999 
$25,000 to $49,999 
$50,000 to $74,999 
$75,000 to $99,999 
$100,000 to $149,999 
$150,000 to 200,000 
Above $200,000 
7. Is English your native language?  □  Yes □  No 
8.  What is the language that you speak/read most?  _______________________________ 
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